@article{oai:ir.kagoshima-u.ac.jp:00010634,
 author = {KAWASAKI, Akio},
 journal = {鹿児島大学教育学部研究紀要. 人文・社会科学編, Bulletin of the Faculty of Education, Kagoshima University. Cultural and social science},
 month = {2016-10-28},
 note = {This paper investigates whether a new carrier decides to enter a slot-constrained congested airport or a secondary airport located far from the city center using a very simple model. In addition, this paper analyzes the slot allocation to maximize social welfare. Then, under the slot allocation that maximizes social welfare, we analyze whether or not the new carrier enters the congested airport. This paper demonstrates the following conclusions. When the distance between the secondary airport and the city center is large (small), the new carrier enters the congested airport (secondary airport). Next, when the carrier’s cost difference between entering the congested airport and entering the secondary airport is small (large), the new carrier has an excessive incentive to enter the secondary (congested) airport. Finally, given that an authority distributes slots to maximize social welfare, if the marginal cost for slot allocation is large, the new carrier may choose to enter the secondary airport, which is not socially preferable.},
 pages = {49--68},
 title = {Entry Airport Selection : Slot-constrained Congested Airport versus Secondary Airport},
 volume = {62},
 year = {}
}